


# **Are Containers Dying? Rethinking Isolation with MicroVMs**

Muhammad Yuga Nugraha

# Agenda


- 1 How we run applications today
- 2 Why are we still using containers today?
- 3 What microVM bring to the table
- 4 The challenges

# How we run applications today




Monolith Architecture

# How we run applications today




Microservice Architecture

# How we deploy applications today




# How we deploy applications today






# Virtual Machine (vM) - The Good

- 1 Emulates full physical hardware
- 2 Strong isolation with its own kernel and OS
- 3 Allows running multiple OS on a single physical host
- 4 Suitable for legacy apps




# Virtual Machine (vM) - The Bad

- 1 Heavy resource
- 2 Long boot times
- 3 Not ideal for scaling




# Container - The Good

- 1 Process isolation using a shared kernel
- 2 Build once, run anywhere
- 3 No need for a hypervisor
- 4 Fast startup
- 5 Scalable with orchestrator




# Container - The Bad

- 1 Shares the host kernel (weaker isolation)
- 2 Not ideal for untrusted workloads
- 3 Security misconfigurations are common
- 4 One container can slow down others
- 5 Not great for apps that expect a full OS



# Docker



Source: <https://docs.edera.dev/concepts/vm-containers/>



# microVM - The Good

- 1 Strong isolation with less overhead
- 2 Fast startup (milliseconds)
- 3 Minimal attack surface
- 4 Multi-tenancy

# Search Results


There are **4** CVE Records that match your search.

Name	Description
<a href="#">CVE-2020-27174</a>	In Amazon AWS Firecracker before 0.21.3, and 0.22.x before 0.22.1, the serial console buffer can grow its memory usage without limit when data is sent to the standard input. This can result in a memory leak on the microVM emulation thread, possibly occupying more memory than intended on the host.
<a href="#">CVE-2020-2025</a>	Kata Containers before 1.11.0 on Cloud Hypervisor persists guest filesystem changes to the underlying image file on the host. A malicious guest can overwrite the image file to gain control of all subsequent guest VMs. Since Kata Containers uses the same VM image file with all VMMs, this issue may also affect QEMU and Firecracker based guests.
<a href="#">CVE-2020-16843</a>	In Firecracker 0.20.x before 0.20.1 and 0.21.x before 0.21.2, the network stack can freeze under heavy ingress traffic. This can result in a denial of service on the microVM when it is configured with a single network interface, and an availability problem for the microVM network interface on which the issue is triggered.
<a href="#">CVE-2019-18960</a>	Firecracker vsock implementation buffer overflow in versions 0.18.0 and 0.19.0. This can result in potentially exploitable crashes.


# microVM - The Bad

- 1 Rarely used in general workloads
- 2 Less ecosystem support
- 3 Tooling is limited
- 4 Not easy to integrate
- 5 Not developer-friendly

# Firecracker microVM




# Apple Container



Source: <https://docs.edera.dev/concepts/vm-containers/>

# Why isolation matters now


# Multi-tenancy




# Multi-tenancy

- 1 Sharing resources (CPU, memory, storage)
- 2 Saves cost by reducing the number of systems needed
- 3 Add new users or customers without setting up new servers
- 4 Easy maintenance, update once for all tenants


# Security in multi-tenancy




# Single-tenancy




User A



User B



User C




User D

# Single-tenancy

- 1 Own dedicated resources and full control
- 2 Higher cost because each user needs dedicated resources
- 3 Setting up new servers to add new users or customers
- 4 Update each system separately

# Security in single-tenancy



**Attacker** focus on breaking isolation boundaries

# ‘Leaky Vessels’ Docker Vulnerabilities Found in Many Cloud Environments: RunC (60%) and BuildKit (28%)

## CVE-2024-1753 container escape at build time

High

TomSweeneyRedHat published GHSA-pmf3-c36m-g5cf on Mar 18, 2024

Package  
**buildah**

Affected versions

1.35.0 through and including v1.24.0

Patched versions

1.35.1, 1.34.3, 1.33.7, 1.32.3, 1.31.5, 1.29.3, 1.27.4, 1.26.7, - - -

← Blog

## NVIDIAscape – Critical NVIDIA AI Vulnerability: A Three-Line Container Escape in NVIDIA Container Toolkit (CVE-2025-23266)

New critical vulnerability with 9.0 CVSS presents systemic risk to the AI ecosystem, carries widespread implications for AI infrastructure.

# Why are we still using containers today?



# What problems does it solve?

- 1 Starts quickly, often within seconds
- 2 No more “it works on my machine”
- 3 Split apps into smaller pieces, easier to manage and update
- 4 Provides isolation for security and stateless


# What microVM bring to the table

# Meet “Firecracker”

- 1 Open-source virtualization technology developed by Amazon
- 2 Powers AWS Lambda and AWS Fargate
- 3 Built on Linux KVM and written in Rust
- 4 Combines VM-level isolation with container-like speed




# AWS Lambda



Source: <https://docs.aws.amazon.com/whitepapers/latest/security-overview-aws-lambda/lambda-executions.html>

# AWS Lambda



```
root@firecracker:~# free -h
              total        used        free      shared  buff/cache   available
Mem:       62Gi       1.2Gi      60Gi      4.2Mi      1.3Gi      61Gi
Swap:          0B          0B          0B
root@firecracker:~# ssh -i id_rsa root@172.16.0.2
root@nicole_perry:~# free -h
              total        used        free      shared  buff/cache   available
Mem:      486Mi       44Mi      399Mi      1.9Mi       55Mi      441Mi
Swap:          0B          0B          0B
root@nicole_perry:~#
```

```

root@cplane1:~# free -h
              total        used        free      shared  buff/cache   available
Mem:      3.8Gi       723Mi      2.1Gi      1.6Mi       1.3Gi      3.1Gi
Swap:          0B          0B          0B


root@cplane1:~# lsmod
Module            Size  Used by
xt_statistic      16384  3
nf_conntrack_netlink  45056  0
xt_mark           16384  9
xt_nfacct         16384  2
nfnetlink_acct    16384  3 xt_nfacct
ip6table_filter   16384  1
ip6table_mangle   16384  1
xt_comment         16384  72
ip6table_nat      16384  1
vxlan              81920  0
ip6_tables        32768  3 ip6table_filter,ip6table_nat,ip6table_mangle
br_netfilter       28672  0
overlay            114688 16
fuse               118784  1
configfs          32768  1
autofs4            28672  2

root@cplane1:~# kubectl get po -A
NAMESPACE     NAME           READY   STATUS    RESTARTS   AGE
kube-flannel  kube-flannel-ds-hrqh8  1/1     Running   0          29s
kube-system   coredns-674b8bbfcf-bwg6b  1/1     Running   0          4m53s
kube-system   coredns-674b8bbfcf-fmjp2  1/1     Running   0          4m53s
kube-system   etcd-cplane1            1/1     Running   0          5m
kube-system   kube-apiserver-cplane1  1/1     Running   0          4m58s
kube-system   kube-controller-manager-cplane1  1/1     Running   0          4m58s
kube-system   kube-proxy-rtw9w        1/1     Running   0          4m53s
kube-system   kube-scheduler-cplane1  1/1     Running   0          4m58s

root@cplane1:~# █

```

# Firecracker in Action



● ● ● 1  
(venv) root@firecracker:~#


root@firecracker: ~

I

- 1 Fast like container, isolated like VM
- 2 Multi-tenancy with single-tenancy-level isolation
- 3 Minimal attack surface for better security

# Who are using Firecracker?

# CodeSandbox - Instant Cloud Development Environments



# E2B - Code Interpreting for AI apps


```
└─~  cat main.py                                     Py yuga Py base at 10:48:16 AM ┐
  ↴
  from dotenv import load_dotenv
  load_dotenv()
  from e2b_code_interpreter import Sandbox

  sbx = Sandbox() # By default the sandbox is alive for 5 minutes

  files = sbx.files.read("/etc/os-release")
  print(files)

  ↴
  └─~  python3 main.py                               Py yuga Py base at 10:48:21 AM ┐
    ↴
    PRETTY_NAME="Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm)"
    NAME="Debian GNU/Linux"
    VERSION_ID="12"
    VERSION="12 (bookworm)"
    VERSION_CODENAME=bookworm
    ID=debian
    HOME_URL="https://www.debian.org/"
    SUPPORT_URL="https://www.debian.org/support"
    BUG_REPORT_URL="https://bugs.debian.org/"
```

# Vercel - Hive



The screenshot shows the Vercel website with the page title 'Vercel - Hive' at the top. The navigation bar includes links for Products, Solutions, Resources (which is the active tab), Enterprise, Docs, and Pricing. On the right side of the navigation bar are buttons for Log In, Contact, and Sign Up. The main content area features a section titled 'How Hive components work together'. The text describes the system's architecture, mentioning KVM, Firecracker, and the box daemon.

## How Hive components work together

The inner workings of Hive is an orchestrated system that ensures secure, isolated, and efficient execution of customer builds. At the core, each box in Hive runs a [Kernel-based Virtual Machine](#) (KVM), which is a full virtualization solution for Linux on x86 hardware. By leveraging KVM, we can run multiple virtual machines, each with its own unmodified Linux image, on a single box. This setup allows each VM to have private virtualized hardware, providing isolation and security between tenants.

On top of this KVM layer, we run multiple [Firecracker](#) processes. Firecracker is an open-source virtualization technology—built for creating and managing secure, multi-tenant containers and function-based services within microVMs. In Hive, these microVMs are called cells. Each cell is mapped directly to a Firecracker process, this 1:1 relationship ensures that each VM is fully managed by its corresponding Firecracker process.

Managing this complex orchestration is a box daemon that runs on each box. The box daemon is responsible for provisioning block devices, spawning Firecracker processes, and managing communication with the cells. It coordinates the setup and lifecycle of each cell by communicating with a cell daemon inside the cells through a dedicated socket connection.

Source:<https://vercel.com/blog/a-deep-dive-into-hive-vercels-builds-infrastructure>



**Vercel**

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A year with Hive: The compute platform behind Vercel builds.

- +30% faster build speeds
- Secure, isolated code environments
- Scales automatically from zero to millions

Here's how it works.

<https://lnkd.in/gTNGvpr6>



**A deep dive into Hive: Vercel's builds infrastructure - Vercel**

[vercel.com](http://vercel.com)

**Firecracker isn't the only microVM out there**



# The challenge(s)

- 1 Not developer friendly
- 2 Integration is more complex
- 3 Limited ecosystem and tooling unlike other technology
- 4 Less adoption and community support
- 5 Runs only on KVM (though PVM is an alternative option)
- 6 And many more...

# Recap

- 1 VM offers strong isolation, containers are fast and both have trade-offs
- 2 microVM bridge the gap, combining VM isolation with container speed
- 3 Ideal for serverless, CI/CD pipelines, and short-lived workloads
- 4 Could microVM be the future of how we run workloads?

# QnA